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Abstract 
We compare the European and Chinese shadow banking systems. While the European shadow 
banking system is better developed than the Chinese shadow banking system, herd behavior 
and other factors in European markets create systemic risk, which contributed in part to the 
financial crisis. Dispersion of risk across the "under-developed" shadow banking system in 
China has led to some cases of localized, concentrated risk, but not to systemic risk. We 
discuss proposed European shadow banking regulation and its implications for systemic risk, 
and discuss what lessons China might glean from such policies. We also discuss what lessons 
China's diverse and systemically uncoordinated shadow banking sector might provide for 
Europe. 
Introduction 
In this paper, we compare the potential for systemic risk in European and Chinese shadow 
banking systems.  Systemic risk has been defined by a Group of Ten (2001) report as “the risk 
that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in 
uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to quite 
probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy.”  There are two types of 
systemic risk that can arise: liquidity risk, in which many institutions face difficulties in rolling 
over their short-term debt or in which institutions cannot trade assets at normal bid/ask spreads 
(Barnhill Jr. and Schumacher 2011); and solvency risk, in which institutions incur unexpected 
losses regardless of the source, type, or size of the losses.  Systemic risk may arise due to the 
structure of bank balance sheets, the interconnectedness of financial institutions, and/or the 
intertemporal nature of financial contracts (de Bandt and Hartmann 2000).  During the current 
crisis, Europe faced both liquidity and solvency risk and contagion due to all three reasons listed 
above: the nature of bank balance sheets, the interconnectedness of financial institutions, and 
maturity mismatches in financial contracts. 
Hence we have seen that a systemic financial meltdown in Europe is a real threat, particularly 
since EU-wide expansion of European banks has been strongly encouraged.  Herd behavior, 
coupled with intensive reliance on the banking sector (given their participation in shadow 
banking activity) and EU-wide dispersion of banking affiliates, presents a threat to financial 
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stability.  This in the presence of complex financial regulations within the EU makes combating 
the threat of systemic risk even more difficult. 
China’s financial system was less stressed during the current crisis than its real sector.  
Therefore it is not immediately obvious where the weaknesses within China’s shadow banking 
sector may lie.  However, because China’s banking system has been slow to transition to a 
modern banking industry, other financial channels (most of which are considered to be part of 
the shadow banking sector) have existed for some time, while new ones have arisen as well.  
The largest part of the shadow banking sector in China, the informal financial sector, has 
existed for several decades (after reform began in 1979) and is comprised of individuals or 
small and medium enterprises as borrowers and individuals and small and medium enterprises 
as lenders.  Risk is greatly dispersed within this system.  The newer parts of China’s shadow 
banking sector are somewhat more integrated with the rest of the financial sector, but their risk 
continues to be geographically dispersed, regulated, or segmented.   
In the sections that follow, we first discuss systemic risk, then the European shadow banking 
sector, then the Chinese shadow banking sector.  We examine and discuss these within a more 
technical framework, then make policy recommendations. 
Systemic Risk 
Systemic risk arises when many financial institutions fail due to a common shock.  Many 
aspects of systemic risk have been explored in the literature.  Applicable to our study is the 
finding that systemic risk has been shown to be higher in clustered asset structures, in which 
banks hold identical asset portfolios, rather than unclustered asset structures, in which banks 
swap projects with neighboring banks but do not hold identical portfolios (Allen, Babus and 
Carletti 2011).  During the crisis, clustered asset structures led to an increase in systemic risk.  
This, in combination with other factors such as maturity mismatches in real estate finance, and 
underpricing of credit default swaps which limited short-selling of mortgage backed assets, 
created a shock to the financial system large enough to lead to a vast meltdown. 
The literature on systemic risk has used a variety of measures to quantify this variable.  A brief 
list of measures of systemic risk includes: examination of interlinkages of credit exposure (Allen 
and Gale 2000); the probability of default (Avesani, Pascual, and Li 2006); conditional value at 
risk (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2009); systemic expected shortfall (propensity to be 
undercapitalized) (Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson 2010); network-based 
systemic risk (Cont 2010); coupled stochastic processes (in the presence of a financial 
accelerator mechanism) (Battiston et al 2009); valuation of put options written on a portfolio of 
aggregate bank assets (Hovakimian, Kane and Laeven 2012); and insurance against systemic 
financial distress (Huang, Zhou and Zhu 2010).   
In this paper, we first diagram the European and Chinese shadow banking systems, then 
perform a technical analysis based on the methodology given in Battiston et al (2009).  Battiston 
et al is important because it assumes that systemic risk increases as the number of 
counterparties increases beyond a certain value and as agents are subject to a financial 
accelerator mechanism.  In other words, there is a trade-off between decreasing individual risk 
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and increasing systemic risk5.  In order to implement the Battiston theory, we use a proxy for 
robustness (debt to equity ratio), bankruptcy indicator, and average number of balance sheet 
connections to other institutions. 
European Shadow Banking  
Europe has already been systemically affected, so we can analyze how the current crisis 
impacted this region.  The current crisis entered Europe’s financial system first through the 
banks.  Banks are closely connected to Europe’s industrial sector and impacts on the real 
economy were immediately threatened.  Aggressive expansion of banks into the subprime 
mortgage area, as well as into foreign markets, increased banks’ exposure to risky loans.  
Securitization of these risky loans worsened matters and transmitted the crisis to the European 
shadow banking system. 
The European shadow banking system is smaller than that in the United States, measuring at 
about half the size of total banking assets, as opposed to equal to the size of total banking 
assets in the US.  European countries with relatively larger shares in the global shadow banking 
system include 13% for UK intermediaries, 8% for Netherland intermediaries, 6% for French 
intermediaries, and 5% for Danish intermediaries (European Commission 2012).   
The financial system itself can be divided into monetary (money-issuing) (MFI) and 
nonmonetary financial institutions (non-MFIs).  MFIs consist of credit institutions, money market 
funds, and other MFIs.  Non-MFIs include investment funds, financial vehicle corporations, 
insurance and pension funds, public financial corporations, hedge funds, and other non-MFIs, 
including financial leasing companies, securities lending corporations, and financial auxiliaries. 
Credit institutions comprise the largest portion of the financial sector, and include banks and 
other types of credit-issuing institutions.  Banks are not part of the shadow banking system per 
se, but held a large number of assets that indeed were part of the shadow banking sector and 
created uncertainty during the credit crisis.  Over the crisis period, banks lost confidence in their 
cross-border counterparts.  Between year-end 2008 and year-end 2011, international interbank 
lending dropped (BIS 2012).  This was caused by a variety of factors, but the shadow banking 
sector played a key role.  The European Commission Green Paper (2012) finds that “under 
distress or severe uncertainty conditions, risks taken by shadow banks can easily be transmitted 
to the banking sector through several channels: (a) direct borrowing from the banking system 
and banking contingent liabilities (credit enhancements and liquidity lines); and, (b) massive 
sales of assets with repercussions on prices of financial and real assets.”  Both of these factors 
transmitted contagion to the banking sector as the crisis unfolded. 
Enhanced money market funds assets peaked at €137 billion in 2007.  However, as contagion 
from the US spread, revealing shortfalls in US money market funds, money market funds in 
Europe encountered problems, including asset price drops and large investor redemptions 
(Bengtsson 2013).  Regulatory differences in money market funds prevail across Europe, 
creating differences in types of investments contained in the funds, variations in types of net 
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asset value used, and differences in the extent of safeguards imposed on fund values, but this 
panoply of funds suffered as uncertainty shrouded financial markets. 
Money market funds were first affected as issues with Luxembourg-Based AXA Investment 
Management were revealed (Bengtsson 2013).  After experiencing large losses, the fund 
implemented a policy of purchasing all shares from investors redeeming at the current NAV.  
French company ODDO also experienced a decline in valuation and was forced to suspend 
activity on the fund, then later to dissolve and liquidate the fund.  Additional issues with money 
market funds surfaced.  Asset managers affected included German financial company Union 
Investment, HSBC Investments Deutschland, French company BNP Paribas, and German asset 
managers Sal Oppenheim and Frankfurter Trust.    
After Lehman Brothers failed, money market funds faced massive withdrawals; in the third 
quarter of 2008, 45 billion Euros were redeemed from European money market funds.  
Authorities in Germany and Luxembourg were forced to intervene to guarantee money market 
funds, and the European Central Bank stepped in to ease liquidity pressures through other 
channels.  Even so, both the net assets of MMFs and its shares of UCITS (Undertakings for 
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directives) witnessed a decline during the 
recent two years (see Chart 1). 
  
Source: European Fund and Asset Management Association, EFAMA 
The €6.2 trillion repo market6, which provides a large amount of financing for both the banking 
and shadow banking sectors, was also severely affected in Europe, as it was in the United 
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States. It became clear during the crisis that margin requirements and haircuts in repo markets 
are damningly procyclical (Constâncio 2012). 
Financial vehicle corporations, with close connections to European banks, were also adversely 
impacted.  Financial vehicle corporations are a type of security generator that is found 
throughout Europe, particularly in Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Italy, but lack 
coordinated oversight.  Common shadow banking assets of European financial vehicle 
corporations include asset backed commercial paper and asset backed securities, which 
themselves were used before the Great Recession to comprise collateralized debt obligations7.  
As markets for securities experienced large losses, financial vehicle corporations in turn 
suffered. 
Hedge funds, too, were affected.  Although they play a much smaller role in the shadow banking 
sector in Europe, hedge funds, considered part of the asset management sector, contribute to 
credit transformation by selling CDS or betting with ABS CDOs (Pozsar et al, 2010).  The two 
main channels through which hedge funds can and have impacted financial stability are through 
market and credit channels. When market dislocations disrupt liquidity and pricing via market 
channels, credit channels experience losses by counterparties, such as banks and brokers of 
failed hedge funds8.   
While investment funds, insurance and pension funds, and public financial corporations are not 
a part of the shadow banking sector per se, there are myriad interconnections between these 
institutions and the shadow banking sector, with assets of these institutions being held by the 
shadow banking sector and vice versa.  This is because the European shadow banking system 
is closely integrated into the financial system, with potential contagion effects through financial 
transmission methods such as interest rates and through interlinkages to other aspects of the 
sector itself (Bakk-Simon et al 2012).  As noted by the Vice-President of the European Central 
Bank, Vítor Constâncio, there are strong ties between the shadow banking sectors and 
regulated banking sectors across European nations (Ibid 2012).  The shadow banking sector 
transmits financial stress both to and from the regulated banking sector.  Credit institutions such 
as banks do a great deal of business with financial vehicle corporations and other 
counterparties. 
What is more, systemic risk is created through long, complex, opaque chains of intermediation 
within and between the shadow banking and banking system.  Using collateral swaps to lend 
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high-quality securities against the collateral of lower quality securities, say, lending government 
bonds against ABSs, is an example. Using the borrowed securities, banks are able to obtain 
repo financing, which can either be held to meet liquidity requirements enforced by a regulator, 
or used again in additional transactions, lengthening transaction chains. The source of hedge 
fund borrowings can be taken as another example. According to the FSA, most cash, or on-
balance sheet, leverage comes from repo borrowing, which, even though the sector saw a 
decline in the aggregate in the latest survey, is continually rolled over9.  
To stem future crises, Constâncio (2012) recommends consistency of policies across countries.  
To that end, the European Commission is in the process of making recommendations for 
European shadow banking monitoring, regulation, and enforcement, with coordination among 
regional authorities, including the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority (EIOPA) and the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB). 
Chinese Shadow Banking 
By contrast, China’s shadow financial system is far smaller and less developed than that in 
Europe.  Despite variations in shadow banking definitions, we include the informal financial 
sector, which does not consist of money market funding of capital market lending, per Mehrling 
et al (2012).  But it does consist of non-bank financing that has extensive ties to sectors that 
fund capital markets through money markets. 
To that end, we describe China’s shadow financial system as being comprised of three levels 
(Li, Hsu and Tian 2012). The first part contains commercial banking and investment banking, 
including bank-trust cooperation in financial products, investment banks, financing leasing 
companies, and insurance brokerage firms and their products. The second part includes quasi 
financial institutions such as micro loan companies, financing guarantee companies, and pawn 
shops. The third part consists of informal financial institutions. 
According to PBOC data for 2011, the system wide financial aggregate is RMB ¥12.83 trillion 
(about €1.43 trillion Euros); banking loans comprise 58.3%, which means that general shadow 
financial activity comprises 41.7% of all financial activity.  Shadow banking and banking activity 
have some interactions, although these are not as extensive as in Europe.  For example, 
commercial banks in China may cooperate with trust and investment companies, or may 
themselves take part in shadow financial activities such as transferring deposits into financial 
management products and lending the funds to investors for short-term projects.  However, 
outside of the commercial banking system, the shadow banking system encompasses property 
securitization, money market funds, and undiscounted instruments, for which the bank acts only 
as intermediaries, not as institutions that back up these funds with reserves.  There is thus a 
firewall around commercial banks’ lending activity.  What is more, the third level, consisting of 
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informal finance, carries out performance of financial functions and risk management outside 
the banking system. 
Commercial banks act, in various, limited capacities, in the shadow banking sector by offering 
several products, including trust products10 (including real estate investment trusts), negotiable 
securities, credit default swaps, and wealth management products.  Outside the commercial 
banking system are trusts, broker-dealer  pension and insurance companies, micro-loan 
companies, guarantee companies, pawnshops, investment or financing companies, 
entrepreneurs unions, private money houses and money brokers, and internet borrower-lender 
platforms.  The ratio of commercial banking shadow activity compared to aggregate non-
commercial banking shadow activity was about 18.5% at the end of Q3 2012 (Financial News 
2013).  
Further, commercial banks themselves, for the most part, are implicitly backed by the 
government. Ownership is held by the government in the form of shares.  Looking at the 
structures of main shareholders of China’s five commercial banks, we can better understand the 
relationship between banks and the government. For example, the Ministry of Finance and 
Central Huijin Investment Ltd play significant roles in the shareholder structures of all top five 
banks. While the Ministry of Finance, as well as the National Council of Social Security Funds, 
are obviously governmental shareholders, Central Huijin Investment Ltd, authorized by the State 
Council, is the main sponsor of many predominant financial institutions. Other major 
shareholders like China Life Insurance Company, Pingan Life Insurance Company of China and 
Baosteel Group Corporation are featured as large state-owned businesses.  Therefore state 
control of banks continues to be implied. 
Credit default swaps issued by banks and bond insurance companies, known as credit risk 
mitigation products, are far less risky than those involved in the US crisis.  These are also tightly 
regulated-- only large, approved financial institutions are allowed to conduct trades and only 
when they own the underlying bonds or loans (Anderlini 2010).  Ownership of these instruments 
is therefore quite limited. 
Negotiable securities companies, which are either part of commercial bank groups or owned by 
independent securities traders, sell shares in funds based on pools of stocks and bonds, which 
are defined as collective wealth management products.  These companies are supervised by 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and their wealth management products 
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are inevitably considerably influenced by CSRC. After restrictions on their issuance were 
loosened, wealth management products designed by negotiable securities companies saw a 
rapid development. Up to November 12, 2012, the number of the existing collective wealth 
management products is was 322 (Sina Finance 2012).  
In these kinds of transactions, negotiable securities companies take the roles of initiators and 
custodians simultaneously, and trade with trustees, a role usually played by qualified institutions 
like large commercial banks.  Wealth management products issued by banks also carry implicit 
government backing.   However, there is a lack of implicit government backing for smaller 
banks, which increasingly issue wealth management products (Cushnie 2012).  From Q1 to Q3 
of 2012, commercial banks issued over ¥20 trillion RMB of wealth management products.  The 
stock of wealth management products was ¥6.73 trillion RMB (US $1.07 trillion).  Wealth 
management products comprise only 11.5% of total deposits, or ¥10.4 trillion RMB (US $156.8 
billion at the end of Q2 2012).  Although potentially risky, these products do not currently pose 
systemic risk as their total size is so small. 
Credit guarantee companies are likely the most interlinked shadow banking institutions, often 
guaranteeing the credit of many non-bank companies in one area.  They are not part of the 
commercial banking sector but are linked to the banking sector through third-party guarantees 
that state borrowers will not default on their loans.   
There have been cases11 in which the failure of one guarantee company has brought down a 
multitude of non-bank companies.  Still, credit guarantee companies are not linked to other 
areas of the shadow banking sector, and their threat of systemic risk is low.  In fact, most credit 
guarantee companies lend money directly to SMEs, and issue wealth management products 
informally.   
Most of the non-bank related shadow banking is further segmented by geographical region, fund 
sources, and even between institutions or individuals.  Although financial segmentation is a 
mark of financial underdevelopment, in this case, the coexistence with low-level forms of 
shadow banking along with high-level forms of shadow banking has served to protect the real 
economy from financial contagion.   
Within the realm of informal or folk finance, we find that informal lenders such as money 
lenders, private equity funds, pawn shops, and rotating credit associations are based to a large 
extent on personal relationships and engage almost solely in lending and borrowing to/from 
small and medium enterprises and individuals, rather than in riskier or more highly leveraged 
forms of financial activity.  Lenders know their borrowers, and borrowers are obligated by social 
relations to repay the loans.  Money lenders and money houses rely on personal connections to 
obtain loan repayment.  This financial activity is not normally linked to other types of financial 
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activity in other firms or regions, except in the case of the rare Ponzi scheme12.  Hence 
contagion from one financial institution to another is rare. 
Micro loan companies, one type of informal financial institution, do not absorb public deposits 
and are set up as limited liability companies.  In order to direct informal funds to the countryside 
and to promote rural economic development, in May 2005, the Central Bank set up 7 
experimental micro loan companies. After that, starting in 2007, the People’s Bank of China and 
the Banking Regulatory Commission allowed additional micro loan companies to be set up in 
various provinces, touching off rapid growth of such companies. At the Q3 2012, the stock of 
micro loan companies measured in at ¥533 billion RMB, amounting to only 0.9% of the stock of 
bank loans. Their main source of funding comes from selling stock shares, endowments, and 
raising capital from less than two financial institutions. Risks posed by micro loan companies are 
low due to their small volume and high levels of repayment. 
Pawnshops are one of the oldest types of informal finance and are locally based, using local 
physical goods as collateral rather than sophisticated financial instruments.  Hence they are not 
connected to the rest of the financial system.  The pawn shop is also not associated with usury, 
deferring to the legal interest rate and accepting supervision from the government as well as the 
public.  A pawn shop must obtain an operation or closure permit from the government, and is 
supervised at both a macro and micro level. By the end of June 2011, China had 5,238 pawn 
shops, three times the number existing in 2005.  Registered capital increased by over 20% in 
the past few years.  The small volume and lack of financial interconnectedness of these 
institutions result in low levels of systemic risk. 
Entrepreneur’s clubs, also informal financial institutions, help member enterprises obtain loans 
due to their close relationships to government officials or experts.  Most of the non-government 
financing transacted by entrepreneurs clubs is used for enterprise management.  These clubs 
currently account for a small share of non-government finance at present. Entrepreneur’s clubs 
are clearly not a threat to the financial system since they are very small in size. 
Internet lending businesses in the realm of informal finance complete the whole process of 
lending and borrowing through the internet. The internet lending platform includes three modes: 
business-business (B2B), business-commodity (B2C) and person-person (P2P) lending. B2B 
belongs to the upstream flow of "goods" and consists of lending from business to business.  
B2C belongs to the terminal sales of the "commodity" from institutions to individuals, where 
money is lent through credit institutions.  P2P is the most important financial internet lending 
platform, and combines personal lending and internet lending. All of the lending processes 
including information, money and contracts are made through the internet, so that it can save 
costs and improve efficiency13. In 2011, the scale of the whole internet lending platform in China 
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exceeded 14 billion RMB. The prospect looks bright. At present, the market risk of China 
network lending platform still exists, so it is essential to strengthen the regulation. 
The investment company is another informal financial intermediary, obtaining funds from 
investors and providing loan to enterprises or individuals. The funds of investment companies 
generally come from idle enterprise funds and households14. Investment companies are 
common in Wenzhou, Ordos and Northern Shaanxi where the folk debit and credit had 
developed prosperously. Influenced by the economic situation and macro-control, lending 
business of Investment companies had developed fast and was not cooled until the Wenzhou 
private lending and owners Of MSEs escaped (Paolu) crisis. However, due to the lack of 
statutory restriction, out-dated risk management method, unreasonable internal control design 
and the lack of regulation, some problems such as raising interest rates in disguise and illegal 
raising fund emerged. 
In 2012, China began to once again permit banks and financial corporations to undertake 
securitization.  As a result, three banks and one financial corporation issued asset backed 
securities. In past 10 years, China’s financial institutions issued ¥56.94 Billion RMB ($7.76 
billion) of ABS. Money market funds are one of the main types of shadow financial institutions 
which serve the purpose of providing alternatives to banks deposits and transform credit to 
broker-dealers. The net value of money market funds in China was ¥4.255 billion RMB at the 
end of 2003 and reached ¥707.5 billion RMB at the end of 2012.  
Bond repo transactions began in 1997, and the scale of the repo market was ¥18.42 trillion 
RMB in 2005, reaching ¥147 trillion in 2012. At the end of 2012, the first hedge fund, Zhongjin 
Aerfa FOHF, registered in Shenzhen Qianhai Modern Service Industral District.  Hence China 
has an increasingly sophisticated shadow financial system. 
Technical Analysis 
At a later date, we shall incorporate measures of systemic risk in China and Europe, based on 
Battiston et al (2009), discussed above.  We shall include a proxy for robustness, a bankruptcy 
indicator, and average number of balance sheet connections to other institutions. 
Below, we first examine systemic risk within the Chinese and European shadow banking system 
in diagram form.  We lay out both financial systems and draw arrows between institutions that 
are highly interconnected.  For Europe, this qualifies as holding assets of the other institution of 
over 1 trillion Euros.  We shall quantify interconnections for China at a later date.  An incomplete 
list of assets and liabilities held by these institutions is also given.
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For the European shadow banking system, the largest financial linkages can be found between 
credit institutions such as banks and other financial institutions (non-bank financial institutions), 
and between credit institutions and financial vehicle corporations.  Hence strong linkages are 
directly between banking and shadow banking entities.  The following table illustrates these 
linkages in terms of assets: 
Table One.  Assets of euro area credit institutions to other financial institutions and to financial 
vehicle corporations (billions of Euros) 
 Loans to 
OFIs 
and 
MMFs 
(of 
which) 
Loans to 
Other 
OFIs 
Debt 
securities 
held by 
credit inst 
from OFIs 
and 
MMFs 
(of 
which) 
from 
FVCs 
2010Q2 1,113 851 1,263 912 
2010Q3 1,093 811 1,294 905 
2010Q4 1,108 845 1,298 954 
2011Q1 1,109 839 1,264 900 
2011Q2 1,132 854 1,246 938 
2011Q3 1,171 864 1,240 969 
2011Q4 1,117 842 1,309 1065 
 
Source: ECB and Jackson and Matilainen (2012) 
Besides these very large linkages, there are linkages across the entire shadow banking system.  
Additional relatively large connections exist between credit institutions and investment funds, 
credit institutions and money market funds, nonfinancial companies and investment funds, 
households and financial vehicle corporations, and credit institutions and government.  
Insurance and pension funds also have extensive connections to the European financial sector, 
although at this time we lack data to distinguish which institutions bear the greatest connections 
to these entities. 
We possess data on balance sheet linkages between entities, however, as Jackson and 
Matilainen (2012) state, “the data are not complete with regards to counterparties and 
instruments which would allow the full macro-mapping of the interactions between the financial 
sub-sectors. In particular, there is a lack of information on holdings of securities issued by MFIs 
and OFIs.”   
For Europe, we can also look at the shadow banking system by country.  The largest security 
issuers are the Netherlands and the UK, issuing mainly residential mortage-backed securities 
(see Tables Two and Three).  Other large security issuers include Spain and Italy, included in 
the table below.  France and Ireland are large issuers of asset backed commercial paper (not 
shown). 
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Table 2.  Security Issuance by European Nation (€ Billions) 
  
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Belgium 5.1  19.0 17.7  27.4  34.9  
Denmark 0.0  0.0 1.5      
France 8.4  16.4 9.0  6.9  14.2  
Germany 5.4  12.9 13.4  26.5  50.1  
Greece 2.0  6.4 1.0  22.5  12.7  
Ireland 1.2  0.0 6.6  13.9  40.7  
Italy 28.5  48.1 16.0  67.9  82.2  
Netherlands 27.4  85.6 138.5  43.8  72.6  
Portugal 1.1  9.9 16.9  12.9  14.8  
Spain 7.0  61.7 54.9  62.4  80.7  
UK 39.0  99.5 102.6  88.4  271.9  
PanEurope 0.2  3.0 2.6      
Other Europe 1.1  3.4 1.6      
Multinational7 0.5  6.0 0.7  41.6  36.3  
European 
Total2 126.9  372.0 382.9  414.1  711.1  
US Total1,2 709.0  1013.7 1,276.7  1,358.9  933.6  
 
Sources: Bloomberg, Citigroup, Dealogic, Deutsche, JP Morgan, Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, 
RBS, Thomson Reuters, Unicredit, AFME & SIFMA 
Table Three.  Security Issuance by Country and Collateral 
2.7. Outstandings by Collateral and Country  
        
2012:Q1 
              
  
ABS CDO CMBS RMBS SME WBS TOTAL 
Austria 0.0   0.2 2.0     2.2 
Belgium 0.1   0.2 71.1 14.5   85.9 
Finland 
      3.7     3.7 
France 18.1 0.2 3.8 18.3 3.8   44.2 
Germany 35.3 2.5 16.2 19.0 8.6 0.1 81.8 
Greece 15.3 3.0   6.0 9.4   33.7 
Ireland 
  0.3 0.4 57.4 2.5   60.5 
Italy 55.2 4.8 10.2 131.3 17.7 1.4 220.6 
Netherlands 5.7 1.3 6.3 281.6 12.2   307.3 
Portugal 6.5     38.2 9.6   54.3 
Russia 0.9     2.7     3.5 
Spain 21.7 1.2 0.5 162.7 80.4   266.5 
Turkey 3.2           3.2 
UK 35.6 7.8 70.6 353.6 7.2 56.2 531.0 
Other7 2.2 2.9   0.3 0.4   5.8 
PanEurope9 3.2 41.1 20.9 0.2 5.8 0.2 71.4 
Multinational5 1.9 121.1 2.4 0.2 0.8 0.6 127.1 
European Total4 204.9 186.2 131.8 1148.4 173.0 58.5 1902.7 
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2012:Q2 
              
  
ABS CDO CMBS RMBS SME WBS TOTAL 
Austria 0.0   0.2 2.0     2.2 
Belgium 0.1   0.2 69.9 17.7   88.0 
Finland 0.5     0.0     0.5 
France 18.9 0.2 3.7 18.9 3.6   45.4 
Germany 33.8 2.5 15.8 18.6 7.4 0.1 78.2 
Greece 15.2 1.9   6.9 9.9   33.9 
Ireland 0.3 0.3 0.4 56.2 2.4   59.6 
Italy 52.1 4.8 10.1 110.1 17.2 1.4 195.8 
Netherlands 6.3 1.3 5.5 271.0 12.2   296.2 
Portugal 6.6     30.9 9.2   46.7 
Russia 0.9     2.6     3.5 
Spain 20.3 1.1 0.5 159.4 70.6   251.9 
Turkey 2.9         2.9 
UK 40.4 7.7 66.0 310.2 7.0 56.5 487.8 
Other7 2.3 2.8   0.3 0.4   5.7 
PanEurope9 3.6 33.8 20.5 0.2 5.3 0.2 63.6 
Multinational5 1.3 118.5 2.4 0.2 0.8 0.6 123.9 
European Total4 205.6 174.9 125.2 1057.7 163.8 58.7 1785.9 
                
        
Sources: Bloomberg, AFME, SIFMA 
 
From the tables above, it is clear that security issuance is spread across Europe.  Regulation of 
these sectors, where they are issued or held by shadow banking institutions, is especially 
important in these countries. 
In China, systemic risk in the shadow banking system does not arise from the process of credit 
asset securitization, because the scale of securitization is very small. Risks may come from 
wealth management products, since these have been increasing in volume. In 2012, banks 
issued more than ¥20 trillion RMB products, exceeding the scale of new loans.  Of these 
products, some floating return financial products present greater risks.  However, the CBRC 
requires banks to back their risks, so they, and going further, the government which in turn 
backs the banks, take on all the risks. 
The CBRC has been very sensitive to preventing financial fallout from the shadow banking 
sector to the banking sector.  The CBRC has asked to build firewall between banks and trust 
companies, so that trust companies themselves will face market risks, such as enterprise 
default risks that occur with an economic downturn.  In late June 2012, an announcement titled 
“Interim Report of the No.1 Collective Trust Fund Plan of China Credit-ChengZhiJinKai in 2010” 
aroused a storm. The announcement explained that the borrower of the mineral trust, which is 
listed as China Credit Trust Co., Ltd with a scale of ¥3.030 billion, brought about lawsuits with 
the allegation that it was hiding funds in secret accounts.  This presented a special case of trust 
risk rather than systemic risk.  
There were only 65 trust companies in China through the first half of 2012, with total trust assets 
worth ¥7 trillion RMB at the end of 2012.  Negotiable securities companies possess total assets 
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less than ¥2 trillion while financial leasing companies possess total assets of ¥1.2 trillion RMB. 
We also know that the stock of banks’ wealth management products measures in at ¥6.73 
trillion RMB.  Therefore we can calculate the scale of the first level of the Chinese shadow 
banking sector in 2012 at nearly ¥18 trillion RMB. 
Credit guarantee companies may encounter more risks because they lend money directly to 
small and medium sized enterprises.  If some enterprises cannot repay their loans, they may 
encounter financial problems and will transfer some risks to banks. The good news is that, 
because banks do not supply many loans to small and medium sized enterprises, risk can be 
controlled. 
Policy Recommendations 
One aim of the European Union has been to provide the ability of financial conglomerates to 
operate across borders.  Member states are responsible for their own financial supervision, and 
EU financial regulation is carried out by the Council of Ministers within the Lamfalussy 
framework (Vander Stichele 2008).  There are now a significant number of intracountry bank 
connections, both within Western Europe and between Central, Eastern and Southeastern 
European nations and Western European nations.  Clearly there were gaps in the Lamfalussy 
framework however.  During the crisis, financial shocks were transmitted between banks and 
subsidiaries in other countries, as credit diminished.  Contagion then spread to other banks 
within affected foreign countries.  As Árvai, Driessen, and Ötker-Robe (2009) show, contagion 
can spread between parent and daughter company in either direction, from home to foreign 
country, or from foreign to home country. 
Additional policies were recommended or implemented after the crisis to address systemic risk.  
The Independent Commission on Banking in the UK recommended that total separation 
between retail and wholesale and investment banking is unnecessary, but that domestic retail 
banking services should be ring-fenced to safeguard them from external influences.  The 
Commission also recommended increased transparency of accounts and a minimum equity 
capital of at least 10% of risk-weighted assets for retail banks (Smith 2011). 
The EU imposed restrictions on hedge funds and private equity.  Although neither caused the 
financial crisis, both pose potential threats to systemic financial stability—hedge funds through 
the credit channel, with potential losses in the banking sector, or through the market channel, 
with potential losses in highly correlated trading strategies (Ferran 2011).  Private equity can 
pose systemic risk when high leverage levels in private equity-backed buyouts increase the 
amount of debt servicing carried out by portfolio companies.  After a series of conversations 
about the need to supervise hedge funds and private equity, a compromise was reached.  This 
policy, called the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, regulates fund activity.  
Under this policy, fund managers must be authorized in their own state, under a minimum 
amount of capital and own funds, with remuneration restrictions and administrative 
requirements. Assets must be independently valued at least once a year.  There are also 
transparency and disclosure requirements, ensuring the production of an annual report.  
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What may be more important and relevant to the prevention of systemic risk is Europe’s 
commitment to the implementation of Basel III under Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV 
(Cœuré 2012).  Basel III would increase bank liquidity and reduce bank leverage, impose 
additional regulations on market and counterparty credit risk, and reduce procyclicality.  This, 
coupled with the adoption of capital surcharges on globally systemic banks and clear 
instructions for the resolution of “too big to fail” banks, reduces the likelihood of another banking 
system meltdown, which is critical in the EU since Europe is highly dependent on bank 
financing.  Further, OTC derivative contracts have begun to be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms. 
China’s shadow banking sector is in its infant stage and rapidly growing.  Although the sector 
currently does not pose a systemic threat, new products and institutions must continue to be 
monitored and regulated.  Currently, regulations control trust companies, finance guarantee 
companies, personal wealth management business carried out by banks, securitization, micro 
loan companies, bank-trust business, and illegal financial institutions.  These have been created 
in response to the rise of new types of business, and the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, State Council, and Central Bank regularly monitor financial activity. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have discussed the topography of shadow banking systems in Europe and 
China as well as potential for systemic risk.  More precise calculations of systemic risk must be 
made in order to inform policy.  As our understanding of shadow banking grows, we will have 
more ammunition to prevent or curtail future financial crises. 
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